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Abstract
Economic models of information security
investment suggest estimating cost and benefit to make
an information security investment decision. However,
the intangible nature of information security
investment prevents managers from applying costbenefit analysis in practice. Instead, information
security
managers
may
follow
experts’
recommendations or the practices of other
organizations. The present paper examines factors
that influence information security managers’
investment decisions from the reputational herding
perspective. The study was conducted using survey
questionnaire data collected from 106 organizations
in Finland. The findings of the study reveal that the
ability and reputation of the security manager and the
strength of the information about the security
investment significantly motivate the security manager
to discount his or her own information. Herding, as a
following strategy, together with mandatory
requirements are significant motivations for
information security investment.

1. Introduction
As information security incidents grow in
frequency, there has been an increase in recent years
in the costs of managing and mitigating breaches. It is
estimated that cybercrime is costing organizations, on
average $11.7 million per organization [1]. Budgeting
for information security expenditures is a crucial
resource allocation decision in organizations. The
budgeting question of information security investment
is often addressed via two main research streams. One
research stream analyzes the budgeting question
through traditional decision analysis. This approach
compares the risk and return of investments. The
return on an information security investment does not
come from increased revenues or decreased costs but
from reducing security risks [2]. Such risk analysis is
based on the measurement of security risk =
(likelihood of a loss event) × (cost of a loss event) [3]
or more complex variations, such as the value-at-risk
approach [4]. The most influential work in this
research stream is by Gordon and Loeb [5]. By
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comparing the cost of investment and the potential loss
caused by possible security breaches, they found that
the optimal security investment would be far less than
(with a theoretical maximum of less than 40% of) the
potential loss if a security breach does happen, and that
the optimal security investment does not necessarily
increase with system vulnerability. Another research
stream employs game theory to view information
security investments based on the actions and
reactions between a firm and the attackers [6, 7, 8].
From the methodological perspective, the game theory
approach is best suited for modeling the outcome of a
specific security technology with limited rounds (often
two or three) of actions and reactions between a
limited number of players (often, the firm and the
attacker).
However, due to uncertainty in information
security, it is difficult to apply cost-benefit analysis in
practice. First, an information security investment has
intangible benefits [2]. Estimating the expected costs
related to information security activities is difficult
because organizations cannot get historical data to
make predictions. But estimating the expected benefits
is even harder, as estimating the expected benefits
requires managers to have information on potential
losses from security breaches and the probability of
such breaches. Second, there are no reliable actuarial
loss statistics [9]; therefore, it is not possible to
estimate the future benefits expected to be derived
from information security investments [10]. However,
although game theory is suitable from a
methodological perspective, applying game theory
requires estimating the attacker’s utility parameters,
which is much more difficult, if not impossible, than
estimating those of the targeted firm.
In practice, information security managers usually
intend to follow the decisions of other experts and best
practices. For example, information security managers
have noted that the expenditure budgeted for
information security for their organizations is largely
driven by best practices in the industry [10]. As a
concrete example, ISO-IEC 27002 recommends
having employee security awareness training
programs; in 2014, 51% of respondent companies
were reported to have security awareness and training
programs, and 57% of respondent companies required
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employees complete training on privacy policies [11].
Occasionally, organizations may adopt information
security technology by following the practices of other
organizations. Studies have shown that organizations
tend to chase the hottest IT [12]. For example, antivirus software, network access control software,
identity management technology, and encryption of
desktop PCs are popular applications among
organizations [13].
The present paper examines the strategy adopted
by managers in information security investment. The
objective of the present paper is to explore factors that
influence an information security manager’s
investment decision. This paper makes several
potential theoretical and empirical contributions in this
regard.

2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Reputation-based herding behavior
Different from the rational assumption in
neoclassical economics, which assumes that decisionmakers gather complete information, design all
possible alternatives, compare, and choose an
alternative [14], herding behavior was originally used
to describe the behavior of investment decisionmakers who follow the decisions of earlier adopters
[15, 16]. Herding behavior has also been found in IT
adoption, for example, downloading popular software
products [17], adopting wiki systems [18], and general
purchase decision-making [19].
Scharfstein and Stein [20] developed the
reputational herding model, in which they suggested
that managers with good reputations are more
conservative in bucking the consensus and herd to
protect their current status. Sun [18] developed two
new concepts to describe herding behavior in
technology adoption: imitating others and discounting
own information. Imitating others describes the degree
to which a person follows others’ decisions when
adopting a technology, and discounting own
information concerns the degree to which a person
disregards his or her own beliefs about a particular
technology when making an adoption decision.
In this paper, we explore factors that motivate
decision-makers to discount their own information and
how discounting own information affects information
security investments.
Network externalities, information cascades, and
herding behavior are similar (but still different)
concepts that have been used to study imitative
behavior. Network externality emphasizes that “the
value of a technology increases as the number of its

users increases” [21]. Network externalities tend to
reward herding decisions with increased payoffs to
those who associate themselves with the majority. The
rewards of such marginal increases in value go to
previous members of the herd, not to the member who
just joined. There are two ways to differentiate
reputational herding from network externalities. First,
a value-adding mechanism is not necessary in
reputational herding. The main motivations for
reputational herding are to overcome uncertainty and
maintain reputation. Second, the two are based on
different theoretical backgrounds. Reputational
herding results from the agency problem (which
comes from information asymmetry), while network
externalities are based on economies of scale.
Information cascade refers to when a decisionmaker ignores his or her own private information,
which is overwhelmed by publicly observable
information, and instead, mimics others’ actions [22].
Information cascade theory is also associated with the
theory of institutional mimetic isomorphism, in which
institutions tend to imitate each another in technology
adoption decision-making [16, 23, 24]. Reputational
herding theory and information cascade theory share
the characteristics peer influences and uncertainty in
decision-making. Reputational herding differs from an
information cascade in that the former includes
managers’ reputational concerns in addition to the
latter. Information cascade theory shows that herding
behavior can be tracked back to information
asymmetries and the problems associated with
observational learning. However, the reputational
herding model demonstrates that herding may be
caused by managerial incentive problems. Therefore,
the reputational herding model connects agency theory
and rational observational learning.

2.2. Research model and hypotheses
To understand information security investment
decision-making in organizations, reputational
herding theory [20] is used as the basis for our
theoretical model (Figure 1). Reputational herding
theory claims that if an investment manager is
uncertain about his or her ability to decide on an
investment, conformity with other investment
professionals is a good choice [20]. This is because of
the following key assumptions of the theory: i) There
are systematically unpredictable components of the
investment value, and ii) smart managers make similar
decisions. If managers make the same decision as
others, they will be evaluated more favorably because
they can share the blame. Reputational herding theory
emphasizes the unpredictability of the value of
decisions; therefore, the theory explains decision-
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making under uncertainty very well. We expect this
theory to be well suited for explaining information
security
investment,
which
also
involves
unpredictability of the value.

Figure 1. Research model
2.2.1. Strength of the information. In the
reputational herding model, previous information [20]
refers to information that has previously been made
public and shows a probability of deriving profit from
an investment. The reputational herding model
suggests that when previous information is strong and
consistent with the majority’s actions, the decisionmaker tends to follow the actions of the majority.
Here, following Hirshleifer [25], we define the
strength of information as the extremeness of public
information that shows the probability of deriving
profit from an information security investment. Based
on this, we construct our first hypothesis:
H1: The strength of the information is positively
associated with information security investment.
2.2.2. Ability to analyze an investment decision.
When a person has incomplete information, he or she
perceives inability to predict something accurately
[26]. In the information security investment context, it
is usually difficult for information security managers
to predict when hackers’ next attack will occur,
especially successful, expensive, and destructive
attacks (state of uncertainty). The damage from an
information security breach (or attack) is difficult for
information security managers to assess (effect
uncertainty). It is also difficult to guarantee that the
information security investment will efficiently
prevent all security breaches (response uncertainty).
1

IS studies that focused on uncertainty related to IS complexity, IS
performance and quality operationalize uncertainty so as to
represent the level of uncertainty anxiety experienced by users
related to a change, which refers to the psychological uncertainty
and the associated stress. Our ability construct does not need to

Consequently, it is difficult to accurately predict the
value of the information security investment.1
Previous research has shown that when people feel
uncertain about a decision, they are likely to follow
others [18, 27, 28, 29]. Therefore, we construct the
following hypotheses:
H2a: A manager’s ability to accurately predict the
value of an information security investment is
positively associated with the information security
investment.
H2b: A manager’s ability to accurately predict the
value of an information security investment is
negatively associated with discounting his or her own
information.
2.2.3. Managers’ reputation. Reputation can be
important to managers because it brings autonomy,
power, and career success [30]. Reputation shows a
manager’s ability. From the agency theory
perspective, a manager’s reputation also indicates that
his or her behavior is predictable, and no close monitor
is needed for a manager’s actions. As managers gain a
good reputation, they also gain power [31, 32], which
may be derived from not only formal but also informal
authority; the authority to delegate tasks is an example
of this power. Reputation also has the ability to affect
performance
evaluations,
promotions,
and
compensation [33].
A manager’s reputation is updated when the labor
market checks whether he or she makes smart
decisions. A smart decision can be evaluated in terms
of whether it is a profitable decision for the
organization or whether the decision is similar to those
made in other organizations [20]. If reputation is
important to managers, they may generally avoid
making dumb decisions. For instance, Brandenburger
and Polak [34] suggested that a firm can have a
reputational incentive to make investment decisions
that are consistent with a previous belief regarding the
profitability of a project, even if the firm has superior
information than public.
As we discussed above, the difficulty of accurately
predicting the value of an information security
investment results in difficulty evaluating whether
managers’ decisions are profitable. Therefore,
managers who have reputational concerns tend to
make decisions that are consistent with others’
decisions to maintain their reputations. Based on this,
we construct the following hypotheses:

measure the anxiety, but only measure if the manager is able to
calculate cost and benefit related with information security
investment.
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H3a: A manager’s reputation is positively
associated with herd behavior.
H3b: Reputation enhances the relationship
between ability and information security investment.
2.2.4. Impact of discounting own information on
information
security
investment.
Previous
researchers suggested two main reasons why
investment managers mimic the investment decisions
of other managers. First, managers mimic others to
avoid the risk of being considered incapable [20, 28].
Second, if a manager makes an unprofitable
investment by following others, “sharing the blame”
with others who made the same decision makes the
mistake more acceptable. Herding is considered a
legitimate strategy for people with good reputations to
protect their status [28]. In the context of information
security investment, a manager may imitate others in
making an investment decision. Even if the decision
turns out to be inefficient, the manager is not alone in
having made the wrong decision and thus, shares the
blame with others who also accepted or rejected an
efficient information security investment. Thus, this
potentially spares the manager his or her own
reputation. Such a positive association with herd
behavior leads to the construction of the following
hypothesis:
H4: Discounting one’s own information is
positively associated with a manager’s information
security investment decision.
2.2.5. Mandatory requirements. As more people
have realized the value of information, governments
have enacted various laws to secure information in
cyberspace, such as the Gramm-Leach-Billy Act, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act Security Rule, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the recent EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018. Security
managers are faced with the complex challenge of
meeting the multiple compliance requirements of a
growing array of federal, state, and industry standards.
Given this aim, we sought to determine whether
mandatory requirements ensure compliance. This
investigation led to the formulation of the following
hypothesis:
H5: Mandatory requirements are positively
associated with a manager’s information security
investment.

3. Research method and data analysis
3.1. Operationalization of constructs

This study utilized instruments that were validated
in previous studies. For example, the items used to
measure discounting one’s own information were
adopted from Sun [18], items assessing reputation
were adopted from Zinko et al. [30], items assessing
mandatory requirements were adopted from Boss et al.
[35] and items assessing use of information security
management standards were adopted from Beaudry
and Pinsonneault [36]. We adopted previous measures
after carefully considering the information security
investment context. All items were assessed using a
seven-point Likert scale.
Because there were no previously validated
instruments for assessing ability and the strength of
information, we developed new instruments in this
study to assess ability and strength. We followed the
procedure from Mackenzie et al. [37]. The instrument
development process resulted in four items for
assessing ability and three items for assessing the
strength of the information. Content validity for all
measures was established through a literature review
and a content validity expert panel that comprised
eight researchers (faculty and doctoral students) who
were skilled in quantitative research methods.

3.2. Pretest
A pretest survey was conducted at one university
in Finland. A total of 32 responses were collected. An
open question was included to allow the participants
to comment on the wording, content, and length of the
questionnaire. The questionnaire was revised using the
responses. To assess the reliability of the scales,
Cronbach’s alpha [38] was used. Items with high
“Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted” statistics, or small
standard deviation scores (and thus, low explanatory
power) were deleted, bearing in mind the content
validity.

3.3. Survey administration
The main field study was conducted among
information security managers in Finland, a developed
country in which a number of organizations are
increasingly aware of information security investment
issues. The survey was sent to the 1,042 Finnish
companies. A research assistant called these
companies and asked for the name of the chief
information security officer (CISO) or a similar title.
The survey was mailed to them. As an incentive to
participate, we offered to provide the organizations a
report of the findings upon conclusion of the study.
Out of the 1,042 surveys distributed to these
organizations, 110 responses were obtained.
Respondents returned the completed surveys by using
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envelopes with pre-paid postage. We conducted a
structured data screening process. First, we dropped 4
respondents who did not answer a large portion of the
questions. The number of missing values for each
variable was 0.92%, which means we could use the
rest of the respondents. We then replaced the missing
values with a median value. The variance of each
respondent ranged from 0.5 to 2.2, showing that
respondents did not answer arbitrarily. The skewness
and kurtosis values were between –1 and 1, showing
the normality of the data. No outlier values were found
in the data.
The required sample size for evaluating the model
was 60, according to the “rule of ten” heuristic [39].
Given the difficulty of reaching CISOs in large
companies, this response rate is acceptable. More
importantly, the returned surveys were completed by
managers with firsthand knowledge of their
companies’ information security management, as
evidenced by their position and the length of time in
which they have held their position. Table 1
summarizes the demographic information, which
suggests that the sample was heterogeneous.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the
respondents
Frequency (%)
Gender
Male
Female
Age
Experience (years)
Education
Vocational
College level
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Ph.D.
Previous experience
Yes
No
Size of organization
(number of employees)
1–100
101–249
250–499
500–999
1,000+

92 (86.79)
14 (14.77)
Average = 45.16
Average = 10.73
4 (4.55)
17 (19.32)
21 (23.86)
45 (51.14)
1 (1.14)
57 (64.77)
31 (35.23)

8 (9.10)
11 (12.5)
11 (12.5)
10 (11.36)
48 (54.55)

4. Data analysis
Data analysis was performed using SmartPLS,
version 3.0 [40]. A partial least squares (PLS)
technique was selected to test the hypotheses, because
PLS is more suitable than the covariance-based
approach for conducting exploratory research [41].
The primary focus of this research is understanding

each specific path coefficient and variance explained
rather than the overall model fit. Thus, PLS is a more
appropriate method for this research, relative to
covariance-based tools.

4.1. Measurement validation
The latent variables show good reliability. Table 2
shows the Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and
average variance extracted (AVE) of each construct
and shows the internal consistency of the model. All
constructs have a Cronbach’s alpha value higher than
0.7 and thus, display convergent validity [42].
Furthermore, they all show a composite reliability
greater than the proposed threshold of 0.7 that
literature considers good for explanatory purposes
[43]. In addition, the AVE of all constructs is higher
than the proposed threshold of 0.5 [44], which means
that the error variance does not exceed the explained
variance [42].
Table 2. Construct reliability and validity
Cronbach’s
Alpha

Composite
Reliability

AVE

A

0.722

0.721

0.565

DOI

0.756

0.725

0.584

Mand

0.925

0.93

0.822

R

0.893

0.894

0.679

SI

0.899

0.904

0.764

USE

0.857

0.86

0.675

To assess discriminant validity, we use the
Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) ratio, as Henseler et al.
[45] argued it is superior to the Fornell and Larcker
criterion [46]. Table 3 shows that all HTMT ratios are
below the strict cutoff value of 0.85 proposed by Kline
[47] which indicates good discriminant validity.
Table 3. HTMT ratios to assess
discriminant validity
A

DOI

Mand

R

SI

A

1

DOI

0.227

1

Mand

0.279

0.535

1

R

0.713

0.388

0.226

1

SI

0.613

0.235

0.259

0.637

1

USE

0.735

0.547

0.521

0.531

0.526

USE

1

To assess common method bias, we chose the
statistical approach suggested by Podsakoff et al. [48]
and applied by Liang et al. [49]. As suggested, we
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created the PLS model and included a common
method factor that linked to all the single-indicator
constructs that were converted from the observed
indicators. Because the method factor loadings were
not statistically significant and the indicators’
substantive variances were substantially greater than
their method variances, we concluded that common
method bias is unlikely to be a serious concern.

and supported the hypotheses. The table shows that all
hypotheses are supported. We determined the effect
size f-squared of each variable according to the
formula by Hair et al. [50]. Effect sizes are considered
small if they are above 0.02, medium if they are above
0.15, and large if they are above 0.35 [51]. Table 4
shows the effect sizes of the variables. It reveals that
A (ability) has the highest influence on USE
(information security investment) and R (reputation)
has the highest influence on discounting own
information (DOI). Meanwhile, A also has a large
influence on DOI, and R also has a large influence on
USE. Strength of information (SI) and Mandatory
requirements (Mand) have only a small positive
influence (although statistically significant) on USE.
The moderation effect between A and R has a large
influence on DOI.

4.2. Structural model testing
Given that the data displayed factorial validity and
did not display common method bias, the structural
model was tested. The results of the structural model
are presented in Table 4. We used bootstrapping with
1000 samples to determine whether the relations
between the constructs were statistically significant

Table 4. Path coefficients and effect sizes
Hypothesis
H1
H2a
H2b

SI -> USE
A -> USE
A -> DOI

Path
coefficients

T
statistics

P value

0.045

2.206

0.633
-0.393

5.157
2.153

Supported

R square
included

R square
excluded

Effect
size

0.028

Yes

0.751

0.748

0.012

Small

0.000

Yes

0.751

0.548

0.815

Large

0.029

Yes

0.336

0.134

0.304

Large

H3a

R -> DOI

0.820

4.053

0.000

Yes

0.336

0.044

0.440

Large

H3b

A*R -> DOI

0.460

2.692

0.007

Yes

0.336

0.137

0.300

Large

H4

DOI -> USE

0.359

2.749

0.006

Yes

0.751

0.672

0.317

Large

0.004

Yes

0.751

0.740

0.044

Small

H5

Mand -> USE

0.139

2.898

The adjusted R-squared of the model is 0.722 (USE as
a dependent variable), and 0.369 (DOI as a dependent
variable). The constructs of USE explain 72.2% of its
variance, and the constructs of DOI explain 36.9% of
its variance.

5. Discussion and implication
5.1. Discussion of the results
This study developed a model to understand how
information security managers make investment
decisions. First, the findings demonstrate that when
managers make decisions about information security
investments, the ability to accurately predict the net
benefit of the decision is important for security
managers. This ability positively influences the
information security investment decision (H2a) and
negatively influences security managers’ intention to
discount their own information (H2b). During this
process, a security manager’s reputation plays an
important role. A security manager who has a higher
reputation is more conservative and therefore, tends to

discount his or her own information more (H3a).
Reputation also enhances the relationship between a
security manager’s ability and his or her intention to
discount his or her own information. When a security
manager with a high reputation cannot accurately
predict the net benefit of a security investment
decision, he or she has more intention to discount his
or her own information (H3b). In addition, when
information security managers observe a considerable
number of organizations that have made the same
information security investments, the managers are
more likely to make the same decision (H1). To sum
up, the factors above influence an information security
manager’s intention to discount his or her own
information (therefore, adopt a herding strategy) in
making information security investment decisions.
This model also shows that discounting one’s own
information is statistically significantly associated
with information security investments (H4). Although
this is the first application of reputational herding
theory to information security investment research,
previous studies in other fields have shown that
reputational herding theory is an effective strategy in
making decisions under uncertainty. Take Graham
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[28], for example, who studied herding behavior
among investment newsletters. By using the data of
analysts who published investment newsletters, he
found that if the analyst’s reputation is high, if the
analyst’s ability is low, or if the signal correlation is
high, the analyst is likely to follow investment
newsletter’s recommendation.
In addition, the present results show that
mandatory government or industry requirements
strongly affect information security investments (H5).
The result is consistent with information security
literature. Kayworth and Whitten ([52], p. 165)
claimed that “security managers are faced with the
complex challenge of meeting multiple compliance
requirements from a growing array of federal, state,
and industry standards.” For example, in 2018, the EU
GDPR replaced the Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC and aims to reshape the way organizations
across the region approach data privacy. The EU
GDPR requires organizations have clear language to
explain their privacy policies, obtain affirmative
consent from users before their data can be used,
clearly inform users about data transfers, collect and
process data only with a well-defined purpose and
inform users about new purposes for processing the
data, and inform users whether the decision is
automated and provide users with the possibility of
contesting it. In general, organizations must spend
more time and resources on privacy and security issues
to comply with the EU GDPR. From all the discussion
above, we conclude that when the perceived net
benefit is difficult to accurately predict, an information
security manager may adopt a herding strategy to
make information security investment decisions.

5.2. Implications for research and practice
This is the first study that provides more
motivations than benefit-driven via financial
analytical tools for information security investments.
Previous studies developed economic models or
financial indicators to estimate the optimal level of
information security investment. However, economic
models do not work well because actuarial data is
lacking. This empirical study explored and tested
influential factors that were not included in previous
economic models, for example, information security
managers’ ability to accurately calculate the costs and
benefits of information security investment,
information security managers’ reputation, etc.
5.2.1. Implications for research. The primary
contribution of this study is to suggest herding as
managers’ strategy in information security investment
and to investigate the influential factors of a herding

strategy. As information security investment managers
are uncertain about the intangible costs and benefits of
information security investments, applying an
economic model or financial indicator is impossible.
Therefore, information security managers employ
supplementary strategies. This study also encourages
that other supplementary strategies that can be utilized
in information security investment decision-making be
investigated in future research.
The intangible nature of information security
investment limits information security managers’
ability to accurate estimate the costs and benefits of
information security investments [53]. Therefore,
theories that address the concern of making decisions
under uncertainty may be relevant. For example, Black
[54] suggested, “Noise in the sense of a large number
of small events is often a causal factor much more
powerful than a small number of large events can be”
([54], p 529). In stock markets, when investment
managers (or individual stock buyers) are uncertain
about the results of one stock and lack necessary
information to analyze potential benefits (or losses),
they might invest based on noise. Shleifer and
Summers [55] pointed to the advice of financial gurus
as one example of noise. In line with that idea,
Menkhoff [56] showed that investors tend to follow
experts’ opinions. For example, information security
investment managers are more willing to invest in
implementing information security investment
standards that are deemed by experts to be the best
practice.
In addition to the theory discussion above,
different theories in behavioral economics (such as
cognitive biases, heuristics, and investor’s sentiment)
can be applied to explain and predict the issues in this
research stream. Testable theories in terms of
explaining and predicting [57] can be built with
variance or factor models.
5.2.2. Implications for practice. Two potential
practical implications can be highlighted from the
present results. First, practitioners should observe that
it is not possible to accurately estimate the optimal
level of information security investment due to the
intangible nature of information security investment.
In practice, information security investment managers
should switch from pondering the quantitative amount
of an information security investment to paying
attention to what influences information security
investment decision-making. Organizations must
understand that using only cost-benefit analysis may
lead to errors in information security investment
decision-making. However, it may be more realistic to
pay attention to the practices followed by other
companies and then make investment decisions.
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Second, cognitive limitations are inevitable in any
kind of decision-making. In practice, information
security managers can investigate whether these
cognitive limitations have affected their decisionmaking. Regarding the reputational concern of
information security investment managers, we suggest
that senior management and supervisors should
communicate more about the work of information
security investment managers. Therefore, the agency
problem between supervisors and managers could be
eliminated.

6. Conclusion
Because of the intangible nature of information
security investment, and thus, the difficulty of
accurately assessing the benefits of information
security investment, economic models and financial
indicators are not applicable in information security
management. In practice, information security
managers tend to follow experts’ recommendations,
best practice suggestions, and the practices followed
in other organizations. This study attempted to provide
an alternative strategy in information security

A1
A2
A3
DOI1
DOI2
DOI3
MAND1
MAND2
MAND3
R1
R2
R3
R4

SI1

SI2

Definition of
construct
The degree to which
one is able to
accurately predict the
issues related to using
IS security
management
standards.
The degree to which a
person disregards his
or her own beliefs
about a particular IS
security management
standard when making
a decision.
Using information
security standards is
required by
regulations.

The extent to which IS
security managers are
perceived by others as
performing their jobs
competently.

The extremeness of
information that
predicts the possible
outcomes of using IS
security management
standards.

investment decision-making from a reputational
herding perspective. The proposed model was
examined, and the research results provide insights
into making information security investment
decisions.
However, this study has certain limitations. First,
as is the case with most IS research, data was collected
from within a single country. It may be that the results
of this study cannot be applied generally to other
countries and cultures. A much-needed avenue of
future research is to examine the effects across
cultures. Another limitation is the use of field studies
as the only methodology. Although field studies offer
the benefits of generalizability by examining
professionals in actual organizational settings, there
are several weaknesses, such as poor internal validity
due to an inability to control the independent variables
[58]. A longitudinal survey or an experiment could be
used to provide evidence of causal effects.

Appendix
Questionnaire items translated from the Finnish
version used in this study

Statement

Source

I know accurately about the benefit of using this information security management
standard.
I know accurately what benefit we can get from using this information security
management standard.

Selfdeveloped

My predictions for the benefit of using information security management standards
are usually accurate.
My use of this information security management standard is not totally based on my
own preferences.
I didn’t make the decision about using the information security management standard
totally based on my own preferences.

[18]

It is not my own preferences that select this information security management
standard.
Regulation requires information security management standards be used in my
organization.
Legislation requires information security management standards be used in my
organization.
Our organization is required to use information security management standards
according to the regulations.

[35]

I am regarded highly in managing information security in my organization.

[30]

I have a good reputation for managing information security in my organization.
I have a reputation for producing good results in information security management.
I have a reputation for producing a high-quality performance in information security
management.
I know information about this information security management standard, which is:
Extremely
Neutral
Extremely
negative
positive
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
I have information about this information security management standard, which is:
Extremely
Neutral
Extremely
negative
positive
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Selfdeveloped
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SI3

U1
U2
U3

The use of the
information security
standard can be seen
as a sort of
investment, because it
takes time and
resources.

There is information about this information security management standard, which is:
Extremely
Neutral
Extremely
negative
positive
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
To what extent do you apply the information security management standard in your
current organization?
I apply all parts of the information security management standard in my current
organization.

[36]

To what extent do you apply the information security management standard in your
current organization?
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